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Anthony Ferner* 
Public Sector Industrial Relations in Europe:  
Common Trends and the Persistence of National Variability** 
 
This article reviews industrial relations trends taking place in the public sector 
in Europe in a context of widespread state restructuring and public management 
reform. Decentralisation, 'marketisation' and privatisation are examined in terms   of 
their impact on aspects of industrial relations such as employment growth, pay 
determination, and the reform of machineries of negotiation and consultation. 
Having identified a number of common tendencies, however, the article points to 
persisting national variations in the extent and style of change. It seeks to explain 
these in terms of the differing roles played by the public sector in post-war models  of 
development. It also considers the specific national institutional and political 
arrangements - constitutional provisions, the status of civil servants, and the mechan-
ics of electoral systems, etc. - that may hinder or encourage state sector reform. 
 
Dieser Artikel gibt eine Übersicht über die wichtigsten Entwicklungstendenzen 
im öffentlichen Sektor, der überall durch Versuche von Staatsmodernisierung und 
Reformen des öffentlichen Managements gekennzeichnet ist. Es wird untersucht, wie 
Dezentralisierung, Marktmodelle und Privatisierung auf wichtige Aspekte der 
Arbeitsbeziehungen wirken, insbesondere auf das Wachstum der Beschäftigung, die 
Festlegung von Vergütungen und die Verhandlungs- und Beratungsverfahren. 
Nachdem eine Reihe gemeinsamer Entwicklungstendenzen identifiziert worden ist, 
werden anhaltende nationale Besonderheiten im Ausmaß und im Stil der Reformen 
hervorgehoben. Danach wird versucht, diese Unterschiede in der unterschiedlichen 
Rolle des öffentlichen Sektors in den Nachkriegswirtschaften zu verankern. 
Schließlich werden die spezifischen nationalen Institutionen und politischen 
Arrangements, wie Verfassungsrechte, Status der Beamten und Wahlverfahren 
daraufhin untersucht, ob sie die Reform des öffentlichen Sektors behindern oder 
ermutigen. 
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1. Introduction 
The need to 'roll back' the state has become a commonplace of political 
discourse for some years. Led by the proponents of the so-called 'new public 
management' (see e.g. Aucoin 1990; Hood 1991), critics of the massive post-war 
growth of the state have posed broad questions of what the state can legitimately do, 
and of how it does it. They have argued that public interventionism must be curbed to 
prevent 'crowding out' of the private sector and to allow the freer operation of 
markets; and that the state's own activities must be restructured to ensure greater 
efficiency. The 1980s and 1990s have seen such prescriptions incorporated into the 
public reform policies of most European governments.  
The pressures to reform the state flow from a combination of long- and shorter-
term developments - the relentless growth of public employment in the post-war 
period; successive oil shocks followed by economic crisis and deep recessions; the 
resulting sharp acceleration of public sector deficits; the forces of European 
integration and the associated framework of supra-national regulation. The thrust to 
reform has had profound consequences for industrial relations and the management of 
'human resources' within the public sector, and these form the subject of the present 
article. After outlining recent projects for reforming the state, the article examines 
their industrial relations consequences in Section 3. The main underlying question is 
how far the common causes of reform have engendered common processes and 
outcomes in public sector industrial relations. Section 4 attempts to explain the 
continuing variability of outcomes in different European countries. Finally the 
conclusion asks how viable are the assumptions of the emerging new model of public 
sector industrial relations. 
2. Restructuring the State 
One of the main changes of the past decade or so has been the focus on the 
internal processes of the state, rather than on just the level of expenditure (OECD 
1990) (See figure 1). 
First, administrative authority has been widely devolved. There has been a shift 
from bureaucratic, hierarchical procedures to more entrepreneurial managerial styles, 
reinforced by systems of appraisal of performance against targets. In many countries, 
but most notably in Britain and Sweden, central government authority has been 
delegated to agencies with considerable managerial autonomy, allowing the 
separation of policy generation from implementation.  
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Figure 1: Examples of Recent Public Sector Reform Initiatives in Europe 
Austria ### privatisation 
### planned 2 per cent annual reduction in public employees 
over five years (started 1990) 
### improvement of administrative management through 
‘Administrative Management Project’, launched 1988, e.g. decentralisation of 
personnel recruitment 
Belgium ### Decentralisation of executive powers to Regions & 
Communities 
### introduction of 'a true management culture'; new 
recruitment policies; increased financial autonomy; more autonomous 
management regime for public enterprises 
Denmark ### increasing decentralisation and 'market orientation' 
### market-type model introduced for several service areas; 
contracting out (from 1992) 
### privatisation (e.g. of Giro-Bank, telecommunications etc.) 
### experiments with 'free agencies', with greater autonomy in 
staff matters, within agreed budgets 
### local and individual pay supplements 
France ### from 1982, decentralisation of powers to territorial 
authorities (e.g. education)  
### devolution from central administration to the 'field', 
including financial & human resources; 'contractualisation' of relations 
between central government and administrative units (1992 'Charter of 
Deconcentration') 
### privatisation programme (1986-8; 1993-) 
### from 1988, comprehensive policy of public sector 
modernisation: greater staff accountability, closer evaluation of outcomes, 
emphasis on client service  
Germany ### 1983-: efforts to promote 'debureaucratisation' 
### 1983-6: improved flexibility in working time, especially 
part-time jobs 
### planned privatisation of telecommunications 
Italy  ### 1983, 1992: legislation bringing public sector IR more into 
line with private sector (move from state regulation to collective bargaining); 
encouragement of staff mobility 
### devolution of powers to regions 
### initiatives on efficiency 
### limited privatisation of state holdings, especially since 
1994 
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Netherlands ### decentralisation of authority to 'micro' level, e.g. 
municipalities and regional bodies  
### slimming of central government to concentrate on 'core' 
activities, with reduced staff 
### creation of independent agencies as part of shift from 
'resource-oriented authorisation to performance-oriented accountability' 
### greater autonomy (including privatisation) for trading 
activities (e.g. posts & telecommunications) 
### 'normalisation' of industrial relations towards a private 
sector model (collective bargaining, consultation, right to strike etc.) 
Spain ### efforts to promote 'new public service culture', incl. MBO 
and decentralisation  
### restructuring of ministries to allow for more autonomous 
management of individual 'administrative modules' of activity 
### devolution of personnel responsibilities to managers 
### emphasis on service quality e.g. in postal services, 
education and health 
### establishment of civil servants' rights to representation and 
collective bargaining 
Sweden ### emphasis of 1991 centre-right coalition on long-term 
efficiency and planned reduction in public expenditure 
### decentralisation of responsibilities (including for personnel 
issues) to agencies; slimming down of central government 
### decentralisation of elements of pay determination 
### more autonomy for municipalities with reduction of central 
regulations (e.g. the 'Free commune' experiment) 
### policy of privatisation of activities open to competition, 
including at local level 
### strengthening of management by objectives and evaluation 
systems 
United 
Kingdom  
### decentralisation of central government through Next Steps 
Initiative creating 'executive agencies' 
### 'internal markets' in education and health 
### privatisation of major public enterprises 
### contracting out of wide areas of work in local government 
and health services 
### fragmentation of bargaining structures 
### introduction of performance-related remuneration 
Source: OECD 1992; 1993a. 
 
Another form of devolution has been the decentralisation of power away from 
central state bureaucracies to lower tiers of elected representatives at local or regional 
levels. This has occurred in countries as diverse as Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, 
Spain and Sweden, though in Britain, perversely, the power of the central state has 
been significantly reinforced vis-à-vis local government. In France, the 
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decentralisation of responsibilities to regions, departments and municipalities has 
marked a major step away from the traditions of the strong interventionist central 
state, encouraging the growth of service provision by more entrepreneurial coalitions 
of actors at local level (Lorrain 1993). 
A second broad area of reform has been the 'marketisation' of the public sector, 
that is the attempt to make public services approximate more closely the operations of 
the private sector. Thus telecommunications, postal and railway authorities have all 
won greater commercial freedom as corporate status has replaced direct ministerial 
control in Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands among others. More radical 
reform - with Britain as usual in the vanguard - has seen the introduction of quasi-
market competition into hitherto untraded activities. The British government has 
established an 'internal market' in the health service, in effect allowing more 
successful hospitals to win more contracts to provide patient care, and thus receive a 
greater share of resources; something analogous is developing in the schools sector. 
The third element of state reform, and in some ways merely the logical 
conclusion of 'marketisation', is the privatisation of state activities. Compulsory 
competitive tendering has led to the contracting out of many services to private firms, 
not only in Britain but elsewhere: in Germany, Sweden and Denmark, for example. 
Decentralisation in France has encouraged the increasing provision of a wide range of 
local services by private sector companies (Lorrain 1993). However, the main focus 
of privatisation has, inevitably, been the great corporations of the state trading sector, 
not least since the proceeds of their sale help offset escalating government deficits. 
Several countries are well advanced in plans to privatise, wholly or partly, their 
telecommunications authorities, and many have already sold off state-owned 
companies in manufacturing and financial services. So far, however, only France 
seems likely to match the scale of privatisation achieved by Conservative 
governments in Britain, although the political upheavals in Italy may have cleared the 
way for a similarly radical programme. 
3. The Industrial Relations Consequences of State Reform: Common Trends 
The rolling back of the state and the reform of its internal operations have in 
many respects transformed the industrial relations of the state sector. The impact has 
been both direct and indirect. Governments have intervened directly to reform state 
collective bargaining machinery and to cut labour costs (which generally account for 
around two-thirds of current state expenditure) by restraining pay and reducing 
employment levels. Indirectly, the responses of public managers to the changing 
frameworks of responsibility and reward within which they now operate have had 
major industrial relations ramifications.  
Falling Employment 
Employment, which continued to grow until the end of the 1970s (see Tables 1 
& 2), has been curbed pretty well everywhere, although Britain is one of the few 
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countries where levels have actually fallen: in 1992, UK total public employment was 
at levels last seen in the early 1960s (CSO 1994: 168-9).1 
 
 
 
Table 1: Personnel in Public Sector, 1991 ('000s)  
 
 public 
sector 
employment 
as % of 
total 
employment 
Austriaa 590.7 17.0 
Belgium 883.6 23.1 
Denmark 693.0 27.1 
Finland 668.8 28.6 
France 5,469.5 24.2 
Germanyb 4,718.0 16.1 
Greece 506.5 13.9 
Ireland 270.6 24.1 
Italya 3686.7 17.2 
Netherlands 814.0 12.5 
Norway 584.0 29.1 
Portugal 695.6 15.1 
Spain 2,128.1 16.9 
Sweden 1,529.0 35.0 
Switzerlandc 539.4 15.2 
United Kingdom 4,890.0 18.9 
Source: OECD 1994. 
a  1992;     b  western Germany;     c  1985 
Table 2: Public Sector Employment in Europe, 1979-90 
                                                          
1 Attempts to assess the size of state sector employment are a definitional minefield. The 
figures in Table 1 are a rough indication only, given that different countries use different 
definitions of the activities included in the public sector, and these in some cases vary over 
time. 
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 Annual average growth rate share in total employment 
 ‘70-75 ‘75-79 ‘79-84 ‘84-90 1970 1975 1979 1985 1989 
Austria 4.1 3.0  1.9  2.7 13.2 16.3 17.6 19.1 21.1 
Belgiumb 3.0 4.1  0.9  0.7 13.6 15.6 18.3 19.9 19.9 
Denmarka 6.5 4.6  2.5  0.7 17.2 23.6 26.9 30.2 30.1 
Finland 5.0 4.3  3.2  2.2 12.1 14.8 17.2 18.9 20.6 
France 2.0 1.7  1.8  1.0 17.6 19.0 19.9 22.1 22.8 
Germanya  3.8 1.9  1.0  1.5 11.1 13.8 14.7 15.5 15.6 
Greeceb 2.6 3.3  2.2  2.5   7.4   8.2   9.1   9.4 10.1 
Ireland 4.1 4.5  1.9 -0.8 12.0 14.4 16.1 18.3 17.9 
Italy 3.8 2.6  1.4  1.3 12.3 14.6 15.8 16.6 17.4 
Luxembourg 3.0 2.2  1.5  3.0   9.4   9.7 10.6 11.3 11.4 
Netherlands 2.1 2.5  0.7  0.3 12.2 13.6 14.7 16.1 15.1 
Norwayb 5.0 5.3  3.7  2.8 17.9 21.7 24.3 28.1 29.3 
Portugal 4.0 6.2  6.2  3.4   7.9   8.5 10.5 13.3 14.6 
Spainc 7.6 5.0  2.9  4.0   5.5   7.8 10.0 12.8 13.7 
Swedenb 5.3 4.6  2.2  0.0 20.9 25.7 29.9 32.9 31.8 
Switzerlandb 3.7 2.7  1.4  0.9   7.5   9.0 10.1 10.2 10.5 
UK 3.1 0.8 -0.3 -0.2 18.1 20.9 21.2 21.8 19.6 
 
Source: Oxley and Martin 1991: 168. 
a  latest year available 1989;     b  latest year available 1988;     c  latest year available 1987 
The major area of decline has inevitably been in public enterprises. This was the 
result not only of privatisation but also of the rationalisation of remaining state 
industries. Countries such as Italy, Spain and France abandoned, in some cases 
reluctantly, traditional policies of using public enterprise as a 'social buffer' against 
mass unemployment, and as 'hospitals' for ailing private sector firms. In Britain, the 
combined effect of rationalisation and privatisation was to reduce public enterprise 
employment from its 1979 level of 1.8 million to half that in the early 1992. 
Pay Determination 
The real earnings of public employees stagnated everywhere in Europe in the 
1980s and they generally fell relative to the private sector (Oxley and Martin 1991). 
Government attempts to hold back public sector labour costs were fuelled by rising 
deficits - since public employment had grown, the impact on expenditure of pay rises 
was correspondingly greater - and by the convergence conditions associated with 
moves to greater European integration. It was common in the 1980s for governments 
to weaken mechanisms linking public sector pay with inflation or with pay 
movements in the private sector. The tradition of 'fair comparisons' was supplemented 
or replaced by an emphasis on market-related pay. This often encouraged greater 
flexibility within national systems of pay determination, particularly to allow local 
managers to attract scarce staff in tight labour markets (on Sweden see e.g. Wise 
1993; also OECD 1990). At times, governments have resorted to scarcely disguised 
incomes policies, usually in the form of pay guidelines. This has sometimes been the 
trigger for industrial conflict. One recent example is the 1994 dispute involving 
railway signalmen in Britain after ministers intervened behind the scenes to prevent 
the employer reaching a settlement above the government's public sector 'guideline' 
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of 2.5 per cent; another is the unrest in the German public services as federal and 
regional negotiators tried to impose a 'zero' settlement under pressure from the 
Bundesbank for expenditure restraint (Financial Times, 22 January 1994).  
But the clearest sign of the times has been the use of pay determination as a 
device for achieving managerial efficiency goals. Different forms of performance-
related pay have been widely introduced since the 1980s (OECD 1993b). It is 
questionable how far such schemes have promoted productivity and efficiency. In 
some cases they are not linked to formal target setting and appraisal systems, and 
experience has been mixed, leading to the revision of many schemes. They suffer the 
problems of all such schemes (see e.g. Kessler and Purcell 1992), but in addition have 
some that are sui generis. For example, at a practical level, public sector resource 
constraints have limited the funds available for them. More generally, much public 
sector work is not suitable for crude measurement of outputs (e.g. Stewart and Walsh 
1994); while the individual performance ethic runs the risk of eroding the traditional 
ideology of 'public service'. For example, government efforts to impose performance-
related pay in the British schools sector has deeply offended the professional 
sensitivities of teachers. Indeed, the limitations of incentive pay schemes suggest that 
it is their symbolic function that is uppermost in the minds of policymakers: to signal 
the change in ethos away from administrative provision to one based on 
entrepreneurial and managerial logics of efficiency, productivity, change and 
competitiveness (see Ferner 1994: 63-5). 
In addition to the new pay systems, other mechanisms are being increasingly 
used to inject greater flexibility into public administration. Reforms have attempted to 
loosen characteristically rigid job hierarchies and career progression structures, such 
as those of the French corps, encouraging mobility between different subgroups as in 
the various comparti composing the Italian public sector, and allowing greater 
recruitment from the private sector. There has been some erosion of the special 
statutory protection typical of the employment conditions of civil servants in many 
continental European states, although the status of, say, Beamte in Germany remains 
strong, and could have a significant impact on the course of current privatisation 
plans.  
In some countries, part-time and temporary contracts of employment have been 
used to increase flexibility and lower costs (ILO 1988). The great majority of those 
on non-standard contracts have been women, and in many cases their job security and 
employment conditions have been inferior to those of standard workers. The trend to 
part-time working has been particularly marked in Germany, France and Britain; in 
the last of these it has been explicitly encouraged by government policy. But it is by 
no means uniform, and in some cases, the use of atypical contracts appears to be 
falling. 
The Reform of Industrial Relations Machinery 
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The desire to modernise state structures has had a major impact on forms of 
employee representation. First, a strong trend in continental Europe has been the 
erosion of the doctrine of state sovereignty, and the replacement of unilateral 
employer determination by modern bilateral collective bargaining structures. This has 
partly responded to concerns for efficiency. A notable case is the drive to 'privatise' 
industrial relations in the Italian public sector (i.e., to render them more like those of 
the private sector) - particularly under the decree law 421/1992 which brought 3.6 
million public employees under the same general legal framework of employment 
that applies to other workers. Privatizzazione of state industrial relations is seen as a 
precondition for the control of state expenditure (Treu 1991), as well as for the 
'Europeanising' of Italian institutions.2 But analogous developments elsewhere have 
also reflected labour movement demands, notably in the Netherlands, France and 
Spain.  
Second, decentralisation of management structures has been mirrored in the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining machineries in several countries. In Sweden, 
for example, bargaining has been devolved to executive state agencies, in the 
Netherlands, from national to lower (regional or municipal) levels. The pattern in 
Britain, with its tradition of uniform national agreements in the public sector, is one 
of increasing fragmentation. Executive agencies have acquired greater control over 
pay determination and other industrial relations matters from central government (IRS 
Pay and Benefits Bulletin 348, March 1994: 6-10); current plans are for pay and 
grading of all civil servants below senior level to be devolved to individual ministries 
or agencies by 1996. There are similar centrifugal pressures in local government, 
health and education.  
However, there are strong counterpressures to the decentralising trend. Even in 
Britain, the move to decentralised bargaining is limited by political sensitivities of 
services such as health and education, by organisational complexity and in some 
cases the small size of potential bargaining units, the lack of adequate management 
skills at local level, and the rearguard action of unions and professional associations 
to preserve national salary and grading structures (Bach and Winchester 1994; see 
also Bailey 1994).  
In any case, there is a continuing tension between devolved bargaining and 
central state efforts to control public expenditure. Neither is it clear that decentralised 
bargaining will produce more 'efficient' outcomes for the employer: it may merely 
produce what one commentator has called (in the context of the British health and 
education sectors) 'a massed web of local agreements which will prove a nightmare to 
negotiate and implement' (Seifert 1990: 56). Moreover, decentralisation may well 
promote a new pattern of 'microconflict' (Treu 1987), a kind of industrial guerrilla 
warfare, as lightning strikes replace (or rather, supplement) the nation-wide pitched 
battles of traditional public sector conflict. This is made more likely by the growth of 
                                                          
2 Hence the title of Treu's paper, 'Public employment: Will we succeed in bringing it into 
Europe?' 
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powerful occupationally-based groups such as cobas (comitati de base) and 
autonomous unions, prepared to use their industrial muscle to pursue the interests of 
'group-egoism'. 
4. The Persistence of National Variability 
Despite the common trends in public sector industrial relations that have been 
described above, there continues to be a striking degree of variation among different 
countries, both in the extent of change and in the means used to achieve it. Britain is 
the outstanding paradigm of radical state restructuring, far-reaching in its reforms and 
driven by a fierce if not necessarily coherent ideological motivation. The key element 
of the ideology has been an unremitting enmity to the post-war model of state 
intervention and at times indeed to the very notion of the 'public sector'. The 
influence of the British model has been pervasive (not only or even mainly in Europe, 
but world-wide); the current privatisation programmes of the French and Italian 
governments are obvious examples. But state modernisation in the rest of Europe has 
generally been cautious and pragmatic by comparison with the British, and has often 
been achieved with a degree of social and political consensus rather than through 
bitter confrontation and division. Nowhere but in Britain has the humbling of the 
public sector unions been a major objective of state reform (although even in Britain, 
levels of public sector unionism have held up well, and most employees are still 
covered by collective bargaining3 - see Bailey 1994: 116-122).  
This section suggests some strands of explanation for the differences between 
national models. Although 'Britain versus the rest' is the most glaring distinction, 
more subtle variations are also explored. The first explanatory factor is that 
restructuring has been delayed and softened in many countries because of the 
importance of the public sector in sustaining sets of political alliances upon which 
models of post-war development have rested. This has given rise to a process of 
negotiated change. The second is that political institutions have had an impact on the 
rationalisation process: while they have often put a brake on change, in Britain the 
peculiarities of the political system have provided the conditions for radicalism to 
flourish.4 
Public Employment as Part of a Web of Socio-Political Accommodations 
In a number of polities, the expansion of the public sector has been intimately 
bound up with the political requirements of particular 'models' of development. In 
Sweden, for example, social solidarity, represented by solidaristic centralised wage 
bargaining, combined with the provision of comprehensive state welfare under social 
                                                          
3 The pay of about 200,000 employees is determined by indexation mechanisms linking it to 
average earnings in the economy, while pay of a further 1.4 million is set by 'pay review 
bodes' (Bailey 1994: 123-126). 
4 Ferner 1994 (65-74) provides a detailed consideration of different national 'models' of state 
reform. 
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democracy to constitute the 'Swedish model' (e.g. Fulcher 1991; Kjellberg 1992). 
Thus the rise of public employment was entailed by the model. Similarly, in Italy, 
public employment has been central to the viability of a model of social integration 
based on accommodations between the economically dynamic north and the poor 
south, as well as between capital and labour (Ferner and Hyman 1992). Central and 
local government and public enterprises were the channels for the transfer of the 
fruits of industrialisation to the Mezzogiorno, in the form of financial flows and 
employment opportunities. The central role played by public employment is shown 
by its continuing growth - by nearly 20 per cent - during the 1980s. The state sector, 
particularly the nationalised industries, was also in the forefront of the development 
of participative industrial relations, through such achievements as the 1984 IRI 
'Protocol' on structures of workforce participation. The public sector thus acquired a 
peculiar resonance through its symbolic role as the integrator of diverse interests 
within the Italian polity.  
Once a growing public sector has been established as an integral element in a 
web of political alliances, there are often strong forces tending to consolidate its role. 
In post-Francoist Spain, for example, the expansion of public employment provided 
the re-emerging socialist party, PSOE, with a powerful new base of political and 
electoral support, which naturally reinforced its further growth as thousands of posts 
were created to reward adherents. The growing state becomes the site of systems of 
patronage and clientelism sustaining a particular political model. The post-war Italian 
state was the paradigm of such developments until the collapse of communism 
removed much of the raison d'être of the system and the edifice began to crumble. 
Patronage was tacitly institutionalised, with different components of the governing 
alliance occupying their own 'fiefdoms' within the state (for example, in the various 
state enterprise holding companies). 
Where the state sector and public employment has been so much a part of the 
fabric of the post-war model, as in Italy or Sweden (or in Spain in the post-Franco 
period), change has been difficult to achieve since it calls into question the model 
itself, and in extreme cases may be perceived as posing a threat to national 
integration. But at the same time, the very role of the state sector may be undermining 
the model of which it is part.  
In Sweden, the growing weight of public employment created serious tensions 
by challenging the wage leadership of the dominant export sector - the driving force 
behind the economic success of the Swedish model - and by eroding the 'social 
solidarity' that was another vital element of the model. Thus the 1970s and 1980s saw 
increasing tensions between unions in the public sector and those in the export sector, 
as well as between lower-paid groups and white-collar professionals within the public 
sector itself. This endangered the ability of the LO to speak with one voice as the 
peak representative of organised labour. As intensifying international competition 
and European integration increased the pressures on export interests, a tacit anti-
public-sector alliance emerged between private sector unions and employers 
(Swenson 1992: 52-61), signalling the breakdown of the assumptions of the model. 
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The central role of the public sector in both the construction of the Swedish model 
and its disintegration may help explain why Sweden has witnessed some of the more 
radical developments in state restructuring since the mid-1980s (particularly but not 
exclusively under the conservative coalition of 1991-4).  
It is instructive to compare Sweden with Germany which, despite its similar 
reliance on the manufacturing export sector, has not witnessed such a marked degree 
of 'marketisation' and decentralisation of the state. Part of the explanation may be, 
first, that the state has never played such a central role in the model, and its expansion 
has been much less - public employment at 16 per cent of total employment was 
around half the Swedish level in 1990. With pay declining relative to the private 
sector from the late 1970s, public sector labour costs did not evoke the same reaction 
in political discourse as in Sweden where they were linked to one of the highest 
levels of personal income tax in the world (Swenson 1992); nor, unlike Sweden, were 
they seen as a major threat to the competitiveness of Germany's export sector.  
Second, the German labour movement, under the peak organisation DGB, had 
much broader links with the political system than did its Swedish counterpart. While 
LO in Sweden was closely allied to the social democrats, German unions were far 
more pluralist, guaranteeing Christian democrat trade unionists institutionalised 
representation in union governing bodies; a number of prominent CDU politicians 
came out of the trade union movement. Thus the presence of a conservative 
government in power does not exclude the unions from political influence, and this 
may moderate the pressures for change. In short, the same structural conditions for a 
broad anti-state alliance have not existed in Germany. Nonetheless, the political and 
economic stresses caused by reunification may be fuelling pressures for a more 
radical restructuring of the state in coming years: as witnessed by planned cuts in 
unemployment and social security benefits. 
In short, systems may be caught in a double bind in which change is both 
necessary to save the model, but impossible to achieve without rupturing the web of 
alliances upon which the model is based. Thus modernising change when it comes 
may be associated with a more generalised crisis of the model - Sweden and Italy 
being examples, perhaps - and for that reason may be more radical and far-reaching.  
Institutional Brakes on (or Accelerants of) Radical Change 
The institutional framework of state activity may be a powerful influence on the 
form taken by public sector modernisation. This operates, first, at the level of 
historically deep-rooted state traditions (cf. Crouch 1993). For example, the tradition 
of dirigisme in France contrasts sharply with the strong strand of laissez-faire 
liberalism in Britain (a reflection of the early relative strength and self-confidence of 
British 'civil society'). 
This distinction has permeated the process of state modernisation. Although 
change has been considerable in France - witness the massive privatisation 
programme - it has not led to a radical questioning of the entire role of the state as has 
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happened in Britain. Thus, the government-appointed de Closets Commission went 
out of its way to defend the statut de la fonction publique which guarantees the 
employment condition of civil servants (de Closets 1989), and it criticised the 
unthinking importation of private sector managerial techniques to deal with the sui 
generis problems of public management. Moreover, even the huge privatisation 
programme may have a very different connotation in France where complex 
interlinkages of power and resources between large firms and the state have been 
characteristic of post-war development; such linkages have been in some ways 
preserved by the use of a system of core long-term industrial investors - the noyaux 
durs - in the privatised companies.  
At a more concrete level, the specific arrangements embodied in legislation or 
institutional machineries may likewise influence the speed and progress of the state 
modernisation process, setting limits on the scope for strategic choice by political 
actors. For example, changes in the status of certain public sector organisations in 
Germany - notably the railways and the postal and telecommunications authorities - 
require constitutional amendments and hence two-thirds majorities in parliament. 
This has strongly influenced the 'marketisation' and planned privatisation of Deutsche 
Telekom, since necessary legislative changes require the support of the social 
democrats. As a result the SPD has been able to extract concessions that soften the 
impact of privatisation - for example, the SPD agreed to back legislation if money 
could be found to guarantee future pensions payments (Financial Times, 28 April 
1994).  
The protected employment position of German civil servants (Beamte) has 
likewise coloured managerial calculations (Jacobi et al. 1992: 256-62; EIRR 1993). 
To take the case of telecommunications again, until 1989 the Bundespost tried to 
increase the proportion of Beamte, motivated by the prohibition on strike action. 
Since that date, however, management has been more concerned with the 
implications of the protected employment status of Beamte, and it has sought to 
reduce their proportion in the work force, which now stands at 51 per cent 
(Darbishire 1994; see also Büchner 1993). Such considerations mean that the scale of 
workforce reductions that have taken place in the British public sector in recent years 
will be impracticable even following privatisation (since Beamte status could not be 
revoked), and managerial strategies will have to adjust to this constraint.  
A final institutional consideration is the mechanics of the political and electoral 
systems. Forms of proportional representation predispose many European countries 
to coalition governments and consensual, or at least bargained, change processes. But 
the British first-past-the-post 'winner-takes-all' system has given rise to what has been 
referred to as 'elective dictatorship'. This permits an unparalleled degree of strategic 
choice. Thus a minority party with around 42 per cent of the votes cast has been able 
to dominate political life totally for fifteen years, and thus to implement a long-term 
project for the radical reform of the state and other institutional spheres.  
Despite the general picture of national institutional heterogeneity, supra-national 
developments in Europe may well progressively lessen the scope for national 
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difference. On the one hand, the deregulatory thrust of British public sector reform 
has been dampened, for example, by the influence of European Community 
legislation. Most notably, competitive tendering in local and central government and 
in the health service has been called into question. The 1981 Act which incorporated 
into British law the 1977 EC directive on the transfer of undertakings specifically 
excluded public sector workers from its scope. But recent cases in the European court 
have undermined that narrow interpretation and opened the way for legal challenges 
by the unions in the British courts. This has created sufficient uncertainty among both 
public employers and potential private sector contractors to stall further contracting 
out of services in many areas of the public sector.  
On the other hand, the European Union framework of legislation, particularly in 
the context of deregulation of markets and economic integration, has also sometimes 
weakened national institutional bulwarks against state restructuring. Thus the 
provision of public infrastructure has been opened up to competition, a key example 
being that of telecommunications: in June 1993, the larger member states agreed to 
open all domestic and international voice telephony to competition by January 1998. 
As a result, the next few years will see the ending of public monopolies in Europe, 
and in several countries the telecommunications authorities will be at least partially 
privatised, and in almost all cases are becoming more 'commercial' in their 
operations. Another example is the increasing concern with the impact of state 
subsidies for public enterprises on competition in the single European market, leading 
private sector interest groups to clamour for the European Commission to veto 
injections of state aid in sectors such as airlines or steel. In the recent case of Air 
France restructuring plans, approval for government subsidies was linked by the EU 
transport commissioner to liberalisation of the French market (see Financial Times 13 
April 1994); while the use of Community funds to ease the social consequences of 
steel restructuring was dependent on companies achieving agreed capacity reductions 
(see Keep 1993). 
5. Conclusion: The Viability of the New State Model 
To summarise the argument, common pressures to reform the state and its 
employee relations have affected every European country in the last decade and a 
half. In some ways, these general pressures are on the increase - in particular, the 
continuing internationalisation of markets and the cross-border growth of competition 
in sectors such as telecommunications, cars, energy and air transport are forcing the 
deregulation of areas of activity in which the state has traditionally had an important 
and often predominant role. The result has been a general reassessment of the role of 
the state and the way it conducts its activities. This has had profound but far from 
uniform effects on industrial relations. The form taken by each national model of 
state reform has depended on a combination of institutional, political and economic 
factors: historical state traditions; the detail of political and constitutional systems; 
the strategic alliances underpinning post-war models of development, and the 
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centrality of the state and its interest groups in these models; and the size of the state 
in the economy. 
One question is how far this heterogeneity is likely to persist in the future. As 
mentioned, there are some signs of convergence as a result of the influence of the 
framework of supra-national European regulation in areas such as competition and 
social policy. Although this may be eroding the power of national polities to pursue 
their own state reform strategies, there are as yet no signs of a general 
homogenisation of approach.  
A second, rather different, question is how far the reform of the state will lead to 
a convergence between the employment relations of the public and the private sector. 
There are indications that the traditional distinctiveness of the two is breaking down. 
One reason is that modernisation is eliminating vestiges of older state traditions that 
supported a separate status for state employees; the chief example among several is 
the privatizzazione of relations in Italy. Another is that the widespread introduction of 
the managerial practices of the private sector - such as devolved responsibility, 
performance-related pay, 'internal markets' and so on - is bringing with it associated 
industrial relations policies.  
There are reasons to think that there are limits to such convergence. These are 
bound up with the question of the viability of the reform path being taken, most 
clearly by Britain but incipiently by many other countries. The key issue is that the 
increasing 'privatisation' of the delivery mechanisms may undermine the achievement 
of the politically-defined objectives that the state exists to serve. In short, there could 
be a serious clash between the 'political logic' of defining 'needs' and areas of 'public 
interest', and the 'agency logic' (Ferner 1994) of service provision.  
In the UK, where socio-political experimentation has been taken furthest, there 
have been indications that the government is ready to resolve such tensions by 
withdrawing progressively from service definition as well as service provision, 
allowing the market to determine what is produced. The very symptoms of failure of 
the new model - the deterioration of public transport infrastructure, to take one 
example - are seen as confirmation of the failure of the state and an argument for 
further marketisation: for example, rail services and the Royal Mail postal service are 
current candidates for privatisation, while the revolution in the management of public 
administration continues with a plan to introduce personal contracts for top civil 
servants, their pay being linked to their success in cutting civil service costs 
(Financial Times, 5 July 1994). However, a profound backlash against the new model 
of public management appears to be gathering pace. An Anglican bishop's recent 
denunciation of the 'internal market' reforms in the National Health Service as 
'unchristian' and 'morally wrong' is a sign of the times, colourful perhaps but not 
untypical of the changing climate of debate on the role and nature of the state. But if a 
sea-change really is imminent, the transition back to a more 'conventional' model of 
public sector industrial relations may be a difficult one: the giant experiment in 
marketising the state has done much to erode traditions of public service, has 
jeopardised workforce co-operation in change, and has tainted the necessary process 
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of evaluating and prioritising political objectives against available resources. 
Meanwhile most other European countries continue to adopt a more gradualist 
approach to state reform. It remains to be seen whether they are merely at an earlier 
phase of their development, with the 'British model' reflecting back at them the image 
of their own futures; or whether the outcome of the British model will deter them 
from following in its footsteps. 
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